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Abstract  
This study aims to examine the franchise sector and determine the significant factors that contribute to an 
increase in the number of franchiser’s contracts in Turkey. Secondary data is used from the Turkish Franchise 
Association and multivariate regression models are run for each sector. Our models explain the change in the number 
of franchise contracts with R2’s varying between .6577 and .7549. We provide evidence that success factors in 
increasing the number of contracts change depending on the sector firms operating in and contracts may be designed 
thusly to pursue success. 
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I. Introduction	  
Emerging markets are developing rapidly 
in the last decade and firms that aim to be 
ubiquitous in these markets are utilizing mostly 
franchise contracts in order to exploit these markets.  
Contracts may also be a useful tool to look at firms 
and their inter-organisational relations (Williamson 
2003). There are various types of contracts 
including joint ventures, venture capital, 
consortiums and franchising contracts. However, in 
this study, franchise contracts are only examined 
and the rest of the contracts are out of the scope of 
this study.  
Among the various definitions of a 
franchise, Stanworth et al (1995), define a franchise 
as a contractual relationship between a franchisee 
and a franchisor in which the former agrees to 
produce or market a product or service in 
accordance with an overall blueprint devised by a 
franchisor. Franchising can also be defined as a 
network of interdependent business relationships 
that allows a number of people to share a brand, a 
successful method of doing business and a proven 
marketing and distribution system. Franchisees are 
the ones that invest their assets in a system and get a 
licence in return to utilize the brand name, operating 
system and on-going support.  La Fontaine (1992) 
states that in a franchisee agreement,” the franchisee 
pays the franchiser for the right to sell the franchiser 
product and/or the right to use his trademark at a 
given place for a certain period of time.” However, 
plain descriptions of a franchise contracts doesn’t 
provide information about the details. Some 
contracts provide wider flexibility to franchisees 
some don’t depending on the situation. Our concern 
is to investigate the determinants of growth in the 
number of the franchise contracts of franchise 
chains in Turkey. 
Franchises can be broken down into two 
categories as traditional franchises and business 
franchises. Traditional franchises give the right to 
the franchisee to sell a product or service in a 
certain location where as, the business format, a 
high level of monitoring and regulating of the 
activities of the franchisee exists in return for 
providing advertising, service methods and delivery 
models to the franchisee.  
Montagu (2002) differentiates stand-alone 
franchises and fractional franchises as well. Stand-
alone franchises are the norm in the West: they 
exclusively promote the goods and services of the 
franchisor, for example, in a Pizza Hut restaurant; it 
is not allowed to sell the products of a competing 
restaurant. However In a fractional franchise, which 
is more likely the norm for micro franchises in 
developing countries, adds a franchised product or 
service to an existing business, creating additional 
income for the franchisee and using existing 
business assets such as shop space (Sireau, 2011). 
II. Contractual	  Completeness	  
When a franchiser makes a contract with a 
franchisee; specific and residual rights have to be 
assigned among the contract partners. Specific 
rights refer to the decision actions in the ex-ante 
period where as residual rights refer to the planning 
of decision procedures to decide on specific actions 
in the ex post period (Hendrikse and Windsperger 
2011). In a complete contract every possible 
situation is covered comprehensively and all actions 
are specified. Therefore there is no residual right in 
that contract.  All rights are specific and clearly 
defined in the contract. The ratio of specific right to 
residual rights in a contract determines the degree of 
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contractual completeness. In other words, the higher 
the ratio, the higher the contractual completeness.  
Contractual completeness may be a significant 
factor in franchising contracts and may be 
investigated in a further study. 
III. Contractual	  Completeness	  
When a franchiser makes a contract with a 
franchisee; specific and residual rights have to be 
assigned among the contract partners. Specific 
rights refer to the decision actions in the ex-ante 
period where as residual rights refer to the planning 
of decision procedures to decide on specific actions 
in the ex post period (Hendrikse and Windsperger 
2011). In a complete contract every possible 
situation is covered comprehensively and all actions 
are specified. Therefore there is no residual right in 
that contract.  All rights are specific and clearly 
defined in the contract. The ratio of specific right to 
residual rights in a contract determines the degree of 
contractual completeness. In other words, the higher 
the ratio, the higher the contractual completeness.  
Contractual completeness may be a significant 
factor in franchising contracts and may be 
investigated in a further study. 
IV. Literature	  Review	  
Despite numerous studies regarding with 
franchise contracts, we fail to find a study that 
provides evidence for the factors that are effective 
in increasing the number of franchise contracts of a 
firm within a sector of a particular market. From 
this perspective our contribution may be unique and 
shed light for further researches.  Past researches 
are grouped into three parts: 
 
 
 
 
Franchising 
From many different perspectives, 
researchers have studied franchising contracts; 
management, law, economy, marketing and finance 
(Dant and Kaufmann, 2003). Investment capital and 
the majority of management decisions belong to the 
franchisees which lead to new store expansions and 
this is one of the factors that have made franchising 
a successful business model. Secondly, fixed costs 
are distributed across the franchisees and economies 
of scale are reached and finally franchisees have to 
work hard with a lower level of supervision as they 
bear their own risks (Montagu, 2002). Corts and 
Singh (2002) have investigated turnkey and day rate 
price solutions seen in contracts of 1874 oil drilling 
projects and found that when the frequency of 
interactions increases between the parties involved, 
the likelihood that turnkey solution is been chosen 
decreases. 
Furlotti (2007) have asserted that the 
contracting problem can be solved via an 
arrangement of proper set of incentives in franchise 
contracts. Arrunada, Garicano and Vazquez (2005) 
have examined 23 franchising contracts in 
automobile distribution; they asserted that 
allocation of authority to the car manufacture is 
positively related with the possibility for dealers to 
damage brand reputation throw improper behaviour.  
Even though numerous studies exist 
regarding with franchising, we couldn’t find any 
country and/or sector specific study examining the 
success of franchising chains and its determinants 
that may affect the demand of the potential 
franchisees. This study is unique from this aspect 
and may shed light to further studies. 
 
Completeness of Contracts 
Regarding with complete contracts, two 
explanations exists for the presence of incomplete 
contracts;  one is to reduce transaction cost, even 
circumstances can be verified, it may be too costly 
to describe it in a contract (Williamson 1975). 
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Second explanation claims that the contract may fail 
to distinguish contingencies or specify some 
dimension of contractual performance (Bernheim 
and Whinston 1998). These arguments are for any 
contract but when the franchising is the case, the 
second argument is expected to be more relevant. 
An incomplete contract may be perceived as 
something negative. However, this may be an 
outcome of the desires of the parties involved as 
they want to reduce their transaction costs (Saussier 
2000). Earlier Crocker and Reynolds (1993) have 
have analyzed 45 airplane engine purchasing 
contracts to prove that degree of contract 
completeness is endogenous to the relationship and 
also asserted that the degree of contractual 
completeness is a reflection of the will to minimize 
economic costs regarding with contractual exchange 
which makes it clearer that there is a trade-off 
between completeness and cost. Moreover, more 
simple contracts maybe more smart and less costly 
when there is less danger in the nature of the 
contract (Joskow, 1987). Hansen and Higgins, 2007, 
have asserted a direct relationship between 
contractual complexity and the allocation of the 
control rates in technology sourcing agreements by 
using the data of pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms. Luo (2002) asserts that completeness of 
contracts is cure for motivation and incomplete 
commitment problems.   
 
Determinants of Complete Contracts 
Hendrikse and Windsperger(2002) have 
examined a database which has 52 franchise 
systems in Austria. They have used training days, 
trust, behavioral uncertainty, initial investments, 
contract design capabilities, environmental 
uncertainty and intangible system assets to explain 
completeness and found that behavioral uncertainty, 
trust and intangible system assets are significantly 
affecting completeness. Reuer, Arino and Mellewigt 
(2004) have examined the factors that affect the 
contractual complexity via sending 257 
questionnaires (response rate of 32%), in line with 
transaction cost theory in the German 
telecommunication industry. They provide evidence 
that entrepreneurial firms design more complex 
contracts the higher the cost of searching for a 
partner and the higher the strategic importance they 
assign to the alliance. They have used assets 
specificity, relational capital, search costs, strategic 
importance, alliance scope, multiple partners, and 
the firm being foreign and firm size as independent 
variables to explain contractual complexity. They 
show evidence that contractual complexity is driven 
by the cost of searching for a new partner and the 
strategic importance of the alliance. For 
environmental uncertainty which is represented by 
contract duration, is taken as a fundamental variable 
in the study of Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978). 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) had response from 152 
computer executives for their main surveys and they 
have used 7- point scale, to measure performance, 
relational governance, contractual complexity, asset 
specificity, technological change, measurement 
difficulty, duration of relationship and other control 
variables to prove that they are the significant 
determinants of contractual complexity. Their 
results confirmed that assets specificity, tenure of 
the directors and magnitude of budget increase the 
level of contractual complexity 
Reuer and Arino (2007) received 91 
responses (48 % response rate) to their mail surveys 
to firms that made alliances according to F&S 
Countries Index-Europe. In order to explain 
contractual complexity, they have used assets 
specificity, prior ties, time bound, strategic 
importance, firm size, foreign ownership, horizontal 
alliance and equity as independent variables. They 
measure contractual complexity as: 
        8 
Contractual Complexity (weighted) =     1/36     ∑ Di 
       i=1. 
Where Di equals i if the it provision2 was 
employed and zero otherwise Parkhe (1993). 
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Their finding shows that contractual 
complexity differs from one alliance to another; 
assets specificity is a significant influencing factor 
for the complexity of the contract. 
1The relationship between complexity and 
completeness has been discussed briefly in the 
study of Hendrikse and Windsperger (2002). They 
claimed that a more complex contract can be bought 
more or less complete; they are negatively related 
when the use of assets is costly and hard to specify 
in a contract, positively related when the use of 
assets can be specified. 
Parkhe developed a series of indicators of 
contractual provisions that are namely; Periodic 
written reports of all relevant transactions; Prompt 
written notice of any departures from the 
agreement; The right to examine and audit all 
relevant records; designation of certain information 
as proprietary and subject to the confidentiality 
provisions of the contract; non-use of priority 
information; arbitration clauses and law suit 
provisions (Reuer and Arino 2007). 
V. Data	  and	  Methodology	  
This study has used secondary data from the 
dataset of Turkish Franchise Association (UFRAD) 
as it is less time consuming and easier to obtain. 
There are 126 firms that are members of UFRAD as 
of 17 January 2012. However, we have eliminated 
the brand new chains that have just started operating 
and the ones with inadequate information and have 
reduced our sample to 106 which is categorized into 
three groups; namely, food with 53 firms, service 
with 33 firms and store with 18 firms.  Quantitative 
data such as the initial fees, average working 
capital, contribution for advertising, continuous 
franchising fee, number of employees within parent 
company, number of employees within franchise 
system, age of franchising and age of the parent 
company have been obtained from the databases of 
Turkish Franchise Association.  
Multi regression analyses are run for the 
clusters generated from the database.  Three main 
firm sets are formed depending on their type of 
businesses they are running; these business types 
are namely; food, service and store. Three 
regressions are as follows: 
(1) NOFFOOD	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  ß0	  +	  ß1IF	  +	  ß2SC	  +ß3AC+	  
ß4ORF+	  ß5AF	  +	  ß6AP	  +	  ß7EF	  	  +	  ß8COS	  +	  ß9EC	  	  
+	  e	  
(2) NOFSERVICE	  	  =	  	  ß0	  +	  ß1IF	  +	  ß2SC	  +ß3AC+	  
ß4ORF+	  ß5AF	  +	  ß6AP	  +	  ß7EF	  +	  ß8COS	  +	  ß9EC	  	  
+	  e	  	  
(3) NOFSTORE      =  ß0 + ß1IF + ß2SC +ß3AC+ 
ß4ORF+ ß5AF + ß6AP + ß7EF + ß8COS + ß9EC  
+ e 
 
    Number of franchise contracts (NOF) is our 
dependent variable. Initial fee (IF), required start up 
capital (SC), advertising contribution (AC), on-
going royalty fee (ORF), age of franchising (AF), 
age of parent company (AP), number of employees 
in franchises (EF), company owned stores (COS) 
and number of employees in the centre (EC) are the 
independent variables that are examined to be 
effective in explaining the change in the number of 
franchising contracts in each sector. By intuition, 
the last two independent factors are expected not to 
be highly significant but still worth to examine as 
trust may be embedded in these two factors. 
VI. Findings	  
Multivariate regression for equation 1 is 
run (appendix 2) and after controlling for 
multicollinearity, an R2 of 0.6577 is attained. 
Significant factors affecting the number of franchise 
contracts are as follows: company owned stores 
with a -2.99 t-statistics, 99 % significant; age of 
franchising with a 1.92 t-statistics, 95 % significant; 
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initial start-up cost with a -1.79 t-statistics, 95 % 
significant; advertising contribution with a 2.57 t-
statistics, 95 % significant; number of employees in 
the center with a 1.81 t-statistics, 95 % significant; 
most significant factor, number of employees in 
franchises with a 4.67 t-statistics, 99 % significant. 
Turkey is an emerging market where labor costs are 
relatively low and in food sector, profit per 
employee may be higher than developed countries 
whereas, initial fee is interestingly, an insignificant 
factor in food business. Age of franchising is also 
valued and this may be related to the trust attributed 
to the franchiser. Investors value franchisers that 
invest in advertising but refrain from the ones that 
heavily invest on their own.  
Multivariate regression for equation 3 is 
run (appendix 6) and after controlling for 
multicollinearity, an R2 of 0.7549 is attained. 
Significant factors affecting the number of franchise 
contracts are as follows: initial fee with a -2,45 t-
statistics, 95 % significant; initial start-up cost with 
a 2.19 t-statistics, 95 % significant; number of 
employees in the center with a 2.19 t-statistics, 95 
% significant. Despite the lower number of 
observations, our findings indicate that franchise 
contracts of stores only give importance to initial 
fee as investors may value relatively higher initial 
fees as a waste of resources. 
VII. Conclusion	  
Turkish Franchise Sector may well be a 
representative for emerging markets where labor is 
cheaper and population is higher and this study 
provides evidence for the factors affecting the 
growth in franchising. Investors of food sector, 
service sector and stores have differing demands 
from franchisers and our inference is that this is 
partly due to the cost structure and presence of 
available financing in Turkish market. Franchisers 
that wish to expand their businesses via franchise 
contracts may be advised to offer their franchisees 
differing contracts depending on the sector they are 
operating and to be successful, they may design 
their contracts by taking our significant factors into 
consideration. 
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IX. APPENDIXES 
Appendix: 1 
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